Joint coordination of donor support for peace processes by Rohwerder, Brigitte
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Joint coordination of donor support 
for peace processes 
Brigitte Rohwerder 
Institute of Development Studies  
08.11.2016 
Question 
What lessons or best practices are available regarding the principles, structure and processes for 
joint (donor, government and non-state armed actors) coordination of donor support for peace 
processes. Are there examples of the elements of effective coordination mechanisms that have 
been set up in advance of peace agreements being signed?  
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 Overview  
This rapid review looks at the publicly available evidence in relation to lessons and best practice 
from joint (donor, government and non-state armed actors) coordination of donor support for peace 
processes1. A rapid review has time limitations which mean what is presented is based on an 
overview of public literature and a few expert comments, rather than a systematic and rigorous 
study, and the findings should be understood in this light. There appear to be few cases of such 
joint coordination, especially in relation to the involvement of non-state armed groups, and very 
little information regarding lessons and best practices in relation to their principles, structure and 
                                                 
1 Most focus seems to be on peacebuilding efforts and little seems to have taken place prior to a peace 
agreement. 
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processes. It is possible that much more joint coordination and lessons learning has occurred than 
can be found rapidly using open source searches, which makes it difficult to gauge what best 
practices for joint (donor, government and non-state armed actors) coordination of donor support 
for peace processes are. 
Countries where joint coordination mechanisms have been attempted include: 
▪ Nepal: The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) is a joint government-donor initiative to 
provide coordination and support for the peace process. The process is led by the 
government and all political parties are involved in its board. Donors have put in place a 
rigorous financial management system, although most of the funding comes from the 
government. A detailed situational analysis was only carried out after the process has got 
underway. Donor concerns about the coordination mechanism relate to financial 
management, perceived political bias in project priorities, weak ability to influence the 
political process and the desire for a peacebuilding strategy from the Government. 
Meetings have been criticised for being overly focused on micro and operational details. 
The joint scrutiny and process created more transparency and accountability, which 
increased trust and confidence. 
▪ South Sudan: The Government of Southern Sudan created a number of different donor 
coordination mechanisms to enhance donor alignment and appraise and approve all donor 
funded interventions. Capacity restraints meant only the largest projects were actually 
appraised.  
▪ Northern Ireland: The EU, the governments of Britain and Ireland, and civil society 
coordinated on peace funding through the PEACE programmes. The programmes initially 
focused on economic activities, building up support for the programme, before moving to 
more peace focused activities, and a conflict analysis was not carried out. The bureaucracy 
of the programme may have stifled creative responses on the ground. Paramilitary 
organisations were eventually drawn into the process, which helped them to transition 
away from violence. 
▪ Mozambique: Donor coordination, combined with their long standing relationship with the 
parties to the conflict, helped with the successful transition to peace by increasing 
transparency and creating a shared understanding. However lack of central coordination 
resulted in duplication, weak local ownership of the peace process, and stretched the 
capacity of the government. 
▪ Sri Lanka: Efforts to create joint coordination mechanisms between the government and 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) proved unsuccessful and endangered the peace, 
leading to serious problems for the government and distrust in the process from the LTTE. 
Some general lessons from elsewhere on joint coordination for peace include: 
▪ Local ownership and capacity is needed to ensure peace is durable. 
▪ Dedicated peacebuilding coordination mechanisms enhance coordination and 
information sharing on peace. 
▪ Inclusive coordination means that all stakeholders feel included and have trust in each 
other, although it can be challenging to include non-state actors. 
▪ Coordination efforts should allow for independence or impartiality so that different 
types of support that may benefit a peace process can exist. 
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▪ Reactive and proactive mechanisms can adapt to developments that threaten to 
compromise peacebuilding efforts.  
 Country cases 
A number of countries have, or have attempted to put in place, joint (donor, government, and 
sometimes non-state armed actors) coordination of donor support for peace processes. However, 
often mention of these mechanisms is brief and provides little detail. 
Nepal 
Following more than a decade of internal conflict a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) was 
signed in late 2006. The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) is a unique joint government-donor 
initiative, operated by the Peace Fund Secretariat (PFS) of the Ministry for Peace and 
Reconstruction (MoPR) to provide support to the on-going Peace Process (O’Gorman et al, 2012: 
5; Burke, 2013: 23). It was established in the aftermath of the CAP and started operations in 
January 2007 (O’Gorman et al, 2012: 12). Its three functions are: i) to function as a coordinating 
body for peace related initiatives; ii) to act as a funding mechanism for Government of Nepal (GoN) 
and donors; and iii) to monitor the peace process. It funds projects in four clusters: support for 
former combatants; assistance to conflict affected persons and communities; promotion of security 
and transitional justice; support to constituent assembly, elections and peace building initiatives on 
national and local levels; while a fifth cluster operates as a cross-cutting theme in the form of 
reconstruction of public infrastructure damaged during the conflict (Burke, 2013: 23). The Ministry 
of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) is the main body responsible for coordinating and monitoring 
the peace process, while the NPTF supports the ministry in this process.2 ‘The NPTF has a Board 
that takes all policy decisions and guides NPTF operations. The Board is chaired by minister for 
MoPR and co-chaired by the Minister for Finance. The Board is assisted by several mechanisms 
– the Technical Committee, Core Cluster, and Sectoral Cluster – to review and approve projects 
on peace and peace building’.3 Commins et al (2013: 28) found that ‘it was vitally important for the 
peace process, that all of the top political parties (irrespective of whether they were in government 
or not) were involved in the board of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund’, although they do not go on to 
elaborate why. Donors have an oversight role through the NPTF’s management structure (Burke, 
2013: 23). Burke (2013: 23) found that the strong government lead, meant that donor influence is 
circumscribed. 
Two-thirds of funding comes from the government, with a third of the funding coming from donors4 
(Commins et al, 2013: 70; O’Gorman et al, 2012: 13).5 The NPTF essentially sought to provide 
predictable funding to facilitate the peace process (Commins et al, 2013: 56). ‘Over time, and given 
challenges in ensuring transparency, donors have supported more rigorous financial management 
                                                 
2 http://nptf.gov.np/faq.php  
3 ibid 
4 Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom (DFID), and Switzerland.  
5 There is also a UN Peace Fund for Nepal which is implemented through the UN system and while there is some 
joint planning/working between the funds, the synergies have not always been maximised (Commins et al, 2013: 
70). 
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systems that have given them greater confidence to continue providing support’ (Burke, 2013: 23). 
A mechanism was built into the NPTF to deal with the need for donors to release funds so that 
they are available when needed (Commins et al, 2013: 56). First donor money goes into foreign 
currency account at central bank but government cannot use it (Commins et al, 2013: 56). The 
funds can only be used when donors release those tranches to the government (Commins et al, 
2013: 56). 
At the very start of the NPTF, a number of assumptions about the context were made to get the 
process underway, with a situational analysis carried out after six months to fill in gaps in the 
context analysis (Commins et al, 2013: 30). Once this baseline had been established, 
reviews/evaluations were carried out by external evaluators, every couple of years, providing 
action points for the government (Commins et al, 2013: 30).   
O’Gorman et al (2012: 38) found that five years after the launch of the joint government-donor trust 
fund, donor concerns related to financial management, perceived political bias in project priorities, 
weak ability to influence the political process and the desire for a peacebuilding strategy from the 
Government (although no more detail on these concerns is provided). O’Gorman et al (2012: 38) 
also found that ‘the GoN and the donors experience the work with NPTF from two different points 
of departure. For the GoN the continuous dynamism in the political give-and-take that is slowly 
moving the process forward is the daily context of work. For the donors similar experiences count, 
but in addition experiences from other peace processes, and the general trend of reduced funds 
and reduced willingness to take risks, diversify the picture, sometimes at the cost of the necessary 
patience with the process in Nepal’ (O’Gorman et al, 2012: 38). As a result, O’Gorman et al (2012: 
38) found a climate of increasing expectations and conditionality influencing donor engagement 
with the NPTF, posing a new challenge for the effectiveness of the NPTF. The joint scrutiny and 
process that is unique to NPTF as a post-conflict peace fund, means that political sensitivities and 
discussion of projects are more transparent and accountable at different levels, which has helped 
to increase confidence and trust (O’Gorman et al, 2012: 38). 
O’Gorman et al (2012: 39) suggest that the meetings of the GoN- Donor Group forum were 
overtaken by repeated criticism of financial management reporting delays, project selection, and 
timeliness of documents, and recommended that it might be good instead to ‘review the purpose 
and agendas for these meetings and consider ways and means of opening up policy space and 
limiting the micro and operational details for other forums’. 
Despite the NPTF being intended to be the main vehicle in support of the political peace and 
transformation process outlined in the CPA, O’Gorman et al (2012: 40) found that a number of 
donors are channelling their support (and an increasing portion of it) focused on the peace process 
either through INGOs and NGOs, through national line ministries and UN bodies, resulting in ‘far 
less coordination, undermining of the national ownership and insufficient account taken of the 
complex and time-consuming national political process going on’. However, an evaluation 
conducted a year later by Particip and Niras (2013: 11) found that ‘NPTF is emerging as the key 
joint instrument through which development partners can harmonise their efforts, align with 
government priorities, and help build capacity in the process.’   
Particip and Niras (2013: 72) found a wide range of opinions about the state of development partner 
coordination in Nepal, with some claiming that ‘coordination was exactly as effective and flexible 
as it could be; others lamented the lack of clarity, the continued overlaps, and described 
development partner coordination in dysfunctional terms’. Particip and Niras (2013: 15) concluded 
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that there is no optimal model for coordination in Nepal and considered the diversity of opinions 
on coordination healthy.  
South Sudan 
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace agreement ended over two decades of war between the central 
Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army and led to the independence of 
South Sudan in 2011. In the early years of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, there were 
numerous overlapping peacebuilding mechanisms and structures which coordinated 
peacebuilding activities in a variety of ways depending on who was undertaking the activity and 
their understanding of peacebuilding activities (Lotze et al 2008: 46). ‘Despite the existence of 
donor coordination mechanisms, these tend to be limited to sharing information rather than 
promoting a joint donor approach based on shared analysis and consensus’ (Bennett et al, 2010: 
xiv). 
In 2006, the newly created Government of South Sudan (GoSS) put in place a number of 
coordination mechanisms (Bennett et al, 2010: 68-69): 
▪ GoSS Donor Forum, which provided a platform for sharing information and enhancing 
dialogue between GoSS and donors. The agenda varied according to the needs, but it was 
generally used as a platform for GoSS to seek enhancement of donor alignment with 
government priorities.   
▪ The Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee (IMAC), which was mandated to appraise 
and approve all donor funded interventions. Its main objective was to ensure that donor 
projects were consistent with GoSS policies, including the aid strategy, and to ensure 
coordination of interventions. The core members of IMAC were the Ministries of Finance, 
Regional Cooperation, Presidential Affairs, Legal Affairs, Housing, the Southern Sudan 
Commission for Census and Statistics, and the Local Government Board (LGB). These 
members met regularly. MoFEP chaired the committee. Ministries belonging to the sector 
in which a project falls were invited as required. Due to capacity constraints, the IMAC was 
not in a position to appraise and monitor all projects; only the largest projects were actually 
appraised. Donors also failed to register activities with the IMAC (only around 20 per cent 
of all projects were registered).  
▪ The Budget Sector Working Groups (BSWG), which were the main bodies for 
government wide coordination and planning, and included donors as well as UN and NGO 
representatives. The ten groups were responsible for developing the annual budget sector 
plans that set government priorities and expenditure allocations for the next three years in 
the given sector. However, some donors noted that GoSS set its priorities in advance of 
the BSWGs, leaving little room for negotiation at the BSWG meetings. The BSWGs were 
also expected to monitor expenditure within their respective sectors, review annual 
performance against the sectors’ objectives and work to ensure the alignment and 
coordination of all partners’ assistance in Southern Sudan. In principle, the groups were 
mandated to be the technical quality assurance instruments for GoSS vis-à-vis proposed 
donor funded projects but as they met only once a year this tended to fall under the 
responsibility of IMAC. However, it was felt that these groups made some impact in helping 
avoid duplication and overlap (Bennett et al, 2010: 141). 
At the time of writing Lotze et al (2008: 50) found that the government coordination structures were 
not operating at full capacity and there was considerable overlap in terms of areas of responsibility. 
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Bennett et al (2010: 143) also warned that there was too much coordination in the form of pooled 
funds which were largely unable to respond to specific local issues. 
Northern Ireland 
Over three decades of conflict ended with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Starting in 1995, 
the EU funded PEACE programmes ‘created incentives for diverse groups to work together in 
making funding decisions’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 57). Bush and Houston (2011: 58) suggest 
that the programmes ‘partnership principle helped both to build positive working relations, and to 
build organisational capacities that were applicable beyond the PEACE programme’. Bush and 
Houston (2011: 58) put forward that the fund’s initial focus on economic regeneration helped create 
buy-in to more overtly framed reconciliation projects. ‘Within a highly politicised and volatile post-
agreement environment, it is very useful to cast funding as widely and generally as possible, to 
increase awareness of, and support for, a programme’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 29). ‘When such 
support has been established – support for both the programme and, perhaps less explicitly, for 
peace over continued conflict – then programming can begin to move delicately into more politically 
sensitive areas of project support (Bush and Houston, 2011: 29). Bush and Houston (2011: 29) 
indicate that ‘reconciliation (however it might be defined) is a non-starter if there is not participation 
in PEACE funded projects within and between divided groups’. They suggest that ‘at the start of 
the PEACE programme, the fact that the primary source of funding was not British, and not Irish, 
reduced some of the potential suspicions that political strings would be attached to projects’ (Bush 
and Houston, 2011: 60). The PEACE programme broke new ground, clarifying what it meant by 
reconciliation as it went along (Bush and Houston, 2011: 63). Not carrying out an initial conflict 
analysis ‘avoided a very contentious and divisive debate that might well have stopped the 
programme from ever getting off the ground’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 63). 
The UK and Irish governments, as well as various different local stakeholders, and the EU, were 
involved in the consultations leading to the creation of the first PEACE programme (Bush and 
Houston, 2011: 25). There is a notable absence of the republican and loyalist paramilitary 
organisations as this was a politically sensitive issue (Bush and Houston, 2011: 25). The direct 
presence of paramilitary organisations might also be difficult for individuals and groups affected by 
their violence and the legitimacy of their inclusion may be questioned (Bush and Houston, 2011: 
25). ‘In the Northern Ireland case, while paramilitary voices were key to the formal political process, 
they only found their way into the consultations indirectly through the groups represented there’ 
(Bush and Houston, 2011: 25).  
‘The capacity of groups to apply for, and use, PEACE-type funding is not (and is never) evenly 
distributed across affected populations’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 59). ‘To ignore this issue risks 
creating a situation where particular groups feel that they are not benefiting from the peace – or 
not benefiting to the same extent as other groups (especially groups perceived to be from the ‘other 
side’)’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 59). (Bush and Houston (2011: 59) warn that ‘the paradoxical 
risk here is that the availability of peace funds may aggravate tensions between groups because 
of the real, or perceived, inequitable distribution of funds.’  
Bush and Houston (2011: 62) find that ‘there is a sense among funding recipients that over time, 
the bureaucratic needs of accountability and reporting have stifled creative responses to 
addressing needs on the ground – even when they clearly fall within the purview of the funding 
priorities of the programme.’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 62). ‘The increased paperwork, in the name 
of transparency and accountability’ meant that some stakeholders felt that ‘unless you were 
applying for large amounts of money, it just wasn’t worth it’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 34). Bush 
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and Houston (2011: 63) also warn that sustainable peace and reconciliation takes time and 
sometimes trust-building and relationship-building do not fit neatly into a time-limited, budget-
determined, logical, framework-managed projects. 
Government departments were integrated into decisions over the allocation and management of 
PEACE as a result of the need to clearly delineate between PEACE funding and normal 
government funding – especially when the projects may look like regular government initiatives 
(such as the building of roads or bridges), but which are meant to have peace building or 
reconciliatory impacts; and the need to ensure (as far as possible) that the particular interests of 
political officials are harnessed to the PEACE programmes, not the other way around (Bush and 
Houston, 2011: 34). Government and state agencies have an essential role to play in building 
peace, although decisions over peace funding should not be politicised or captured by 
particularistic or sectarian interests (Bush and Houston, 2011: 34). Care should be taken that non-
state actors do not perform too many state-like functions, or deliver services that should be 
delivered by the state, as there is risk that the division of labour and responsibilities between the 
state, society and the market are unbalanced, and that the institutional development of the state is 
restricted (Bush and Houston, 2011: 34).  
The approach of the PEACE programme ‘validated work between ex-combatants and promoted 
their social and political reintegration’ (Bush and Houston, 2011: 38).  
Mozambique  
Manning and Malbrough (2009, 90) find that ‘the most important factor behind Mozambique’s 
success [at transitioning to peace] was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of major 
donors, who were committed to making peace work and had long-standing relationships with the 
former belligerents. The relationships these donors had established with the government and, in 
some cases, with Renamo, fostered mutual trust and lowered uncertainty, giving donors a deep 
contextual understanding of the priorities and conditions that were necessary to successfully 
establish peace in Mozambique’. Coordination between donors in relation to the peace process 
elections through the Democracy Assistance Group (GAD) helped exchange information and 
prevent or dispel misinformation about the peace process, which meant that well-informed donors 
were ‘able to reassure a suspicious and insecure Renamo leadership and to reduce tensions 
between Renamo and the government’ (Manning and Malbrough, 2010: 159). In addition, regular 
meetings helped create a shared understanding of the importance of the elections, which helped 
leverage the necessary support and a common reaction (Manning and Malbrough, 2010: 159). 
However, the lack of central coordination which developed in Mozambique ‘often had negative 
effects, producing incoherence or duplication, and taxing the ability of the overstretched 
Mozambican state to participate, monitor, or otherwise be involved in the process. Donors came 
to be seen, and perhaps to see themselves, as the habitual providers of services normally 
delivered by states to their citizens. This undoubtedly contributed later to a sense of donor 
ownership of the peace process: once again, donors would provide where the state could not’ 
(Manning and Malbrough, 2010: 153). 
Sri Lanka 
After two decades of internal conflict in Sri Lanka, a ceasefire was declared in 2001. In 2002, the 
first year of the peace process, the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) set up various joint sub committees (such as the Sub Committee on 
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Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North-east (SIHRN)) to work on issues 
in the peace process and to select projects to be funded, but none of these sub committees got off 
the ground as negotiations between them broke down (Uyangoda, 2008: 199; Sriskandarajah, 
2003: 8-9). Uyangoda (2008: 199) attributes this to ‘the thin commitment of both sides to joint 
institution building during the transition phase’. The two sides worked together and separately to 
canvass international support for development assistance to help the peace process along 
(Sriskandarajah, 2003: 12-13). 
Subsequent efforts to put in place joint government and LTTE mechanisms for aid allocation also 
proved unsuccessful, such as the Post-Tsunami Management Structure (P-TOMS) arrangement, 
or the North East Reconstruction Fund, which was to pool donor funds for reconstruction work, but 
was never implemented due to GoSL-LTTE disagreement over its shared management (Chapman 
et al, 2009: 9, 15). Donors also found it hard to align with changing domestic policy and work with 
the government (Chapman et al, 2009: 15). In addition, Chapman et al (2009: 46) finds that ‘[t]he 
climate of mistrust in Sri Lanka means that information sharing is reduced and the willingness to 
discuss results and engage in joint government-donor-civil society efforts to learn lessons is 
limited’. Frerks and Klem (2006: xii) also suggest that while donors hoped that SIHRN and P-TOMS 
would make peace, they because issues which endangered the peace. These joint mechanisms 
were the only tangible outcome of the peace process with regard to power-sharing and thus were 
a litmus test for the LTTE with regard to government commitment to substantial devolution of 
powers to an autonomous North-eastern administration (Frerks and Klem, 2006: 33). They became 
a legal and political stumbling block for the government (Frerks and Klem, 2006: 33). The 
negotiations around SIHRN, lead to an LTTE proposal perceived as a ‘stepping stone to 
independence’ which precipitated the overthrow of the UNP regime; while P-TOMS caused a split 
in the ruling coalition, leaving the government paralysed (Frerks and Klem, 2006: 33). 
 General lessons  
Common challenges to peacebuilding coordination efforts 
Coordination is highlighted in most evaluations as being very important for peace efforts, and 
Newman and Richmond (2006: 5) warn that lack of coordination of support to peace processes 
could complicate the picture and result in behaviour that effectively constitutes spoiling.  
It is suggested that effective coordination is difficult to achieve as a result of ‘the multitude of actors, 
often numbering in the hundreds…; the high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination 
entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; 
competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to 
limit their margin for maneuver by the discipline of coordination’ (Uvin in de Coning, 2007: 8).  
Lotze et al (2008: 11, 62-63) found a number of common challenges for peacebuilding coordination 
efforts as a result of research carried out in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan. They include:  
Local ownership and capacity 
There is a need for local ownership, capacity and cooperation with external actors, as 
peacebuilding coordination is often driven by external actors, and local ownership is essential if 
peace is to be durable (Lotze et al, 2008: 11, 62-63).  
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Campbell and Hartnett (2005: 14) warn that if donors set up parallel systems as a result of weak 
governments, the development of downward accountability or social contract to the population is 
hampered. As a result it is suggested that where there is weak capacity, donors and governments 
‘work to focus on a limited number of tasks rather than try to spread limited human, financial and 
institutional capital over a range of tasks simultaneously’ (Campbell and Hartnett, 2005: 14). Huber 
et al (2013: 98) find that ‘Donors are also frequently constrained or selective in which aspects of 
implementation they are willing to finance’.  
Dedicated peacebuilding coordination mechanism 
There is a need for dedicated peacebuilding coordinating structures rather than peacebuilding 
being relegated as a sub-theme within coordination and implementation structures. This could 
serve to enhance coordination and information-sharing, and indirectly build the capacity of those 
engaged in the structure (Lotze et al, 2008: 11, 62). 
Inclusive coordination 
There is a need for inclusive coordination so that all stakeholders feel included and are certain of 
the roles and mandates of the other actors within the system (Lotze et al, 2008: 11-12, 62-63). 
Challenges in sharing results and giving transparency to the internal–external relations 
undermines trust among different actors (Lotze et al, 2008: 30). Huber et al (2013: 98) find that 
central governments may object to the provision of external funding to non-state actors within their 
borders, while ‘non-state actors may be wary of being dependent on central government officials 
for disbursements of funds enabling them to implement their commitments‘.  
Coordination should allow for independence or impartiality 
There is a need for coordination that accommodates various needs, as in some cases certain 
actors will prefer not to coordinate, or be coordinated, so as to preserve their independence or 
impartiality (Lotze et al, 2008: 12, 62-63). de Coning (2007: 9), notes that there is ‘tension between 
the need for improved coordination on the one hand, and the potential limiting effects coordination 
may have on the ability of individual agents to exercise control over their own programming and 
allocation of resources’. Uvin (1999: 21) also flags up some potential problems with coordination 
with local institutions as ‘local institutions are usually weak and sometimes biased to the point of 
being part of the problem. Donors often distrust the institutions of the state or do not want to be 
seen as partial, especially in cases where violence is still ongoing’. 
Although they are looking at third party support for peace processes rather than joint mechanisms 
in support of peace, Gündüz and Herbolzheimer (2010: 21) find that coordination should ‘not stifle 
or try to impose full control over the diversity of types of support that may benefit a peace process, 
including differences in approach, and potential strengths and capacities of different third parties 
to act in different ways’ as ‘individual, confidential and parallel efforts can, in fact, be as important 
as collective ones, if not more so’.  
Reactive and proactive mechanisms 
There is a need to be both reactive and proactive to developments that threaten to compromise 
peacebuilding efforts (Lotze et al, 2008: 12, 63). 
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